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Abstract: The author discusses the results of the November 2010 elections in the United States (US), the
transition of power between two very different Senates, and US participation in international treaties
pertaining to nuclear weapons. Of note, are the roles of and problems with the idea of verification as
per modern logical positivism.
As the dust is still settling over the results of the November 2010 elections in the Unites States (US), a
growing concern emerges as to the possibility that the US Senate may not ratify the latest strategic arms
reduction treaty signed between the US and Russia in April 2010. In parsing the professed objections of
the, presumably, loyal opposition, one may identify at least six Issues. First, some senators and their
backers seem to be willing to do just about anything to prevent a political success for the Obama
administration. Second, some of them assert that the treaty language may be interpreted to prevent
some US anti-missile and other defensive programs from going forward without Russian concurrence.
Third, some advocate that the treaty will not allow or will render difficult the modernization of allowable
nuclear weapons capabilities and conventional strike forces. Fourth, some advocate that the treaty-because it does not cover tactical nuclear weapons--is fatally flawed. Fifth, some of them seem to
believe that any reduction or mere maintenance of nuclear weapons capabilities saps US security. And
sixth, the Russians will cheat because they can, and they can because accurate verification cannot be
carried out.
The following is a modification of a 1997 IBPP article on the verification of nuclear weapons.
Verification often proves to be a significant stumbling block in developing, negotiating, evaluating,
signing, ratifying, and implementing weapons limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation treaties—as
well as agreements to maintain present capabilities. One part of the stumbling block comprises the
varied philosophical assumptions--conscious and unconscious--permeating the belief systems of
policymakers, negotiators, and legislators as to verification.
Many of these political actors speak and act as if they are radical logical positivists—even if they've
never heard the term before. They believe that verification must be built on observation and observable
data with crystal clear interpretations completely corresponding to reality based largely on pure notions
of deductive and inductive logic. This reality instantiates as a material world and there is an ideational
world dependent on observable data and interpretation which ensures a one-to-one correspondence
based on logical intermediaries. Total confirmation or disconfirmation of a party's compliance with a
treaty can definitely be attained. It’s almost as if the intrapsychic processes of the parties to the treaty
are non-existent or irrelevant.
The more moderate logical positivists—while adhering to belief in reality as the material world, the
import of observation, and the necessity of rigorous, intermediary and logical procedures—allow that
confirmation or disconfirmation may not be total. Instead, the latter may be partial but approaching
totality through accumulation of data. Induction and deduction may approach complete accuracy as
they seem to almost total disengage from well-known logical problems—the specific counter-example
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to a general conclusion well-know in induction, culture-bound leaps of faith on soundness and validity
between assumptions and conclusions in deduction.
Unfortunately, significant problems occur with the logical positivist approach to verification. (1) Much
of what we observe is dependent on our sensory modalities. Yet through technological advances, we
have discovered that there is more to the world than what we can sense. And even with ever-newer
technological advances, realms of the world more obviously seem to exist beyond the technologymediated observable. And, of course, as we depend on technology to broaden our knowledge of the
world, we lose our direct experience of this world. By demanding observable criteria, the weaponstreaty developer or evaluator is not being hard-nosed, but soft-headed. Realms of the world are being
discounted as irrelevant and meaningless to the detriment of security. The limitations of observation are
further illustrated by well-documented illusions--the products of normative human perception--and by
the vagaries of observation depending on need state--hunger, fatigue, anger, fear, need to believe in an
enemy, and so on. This is the case regardless of combinations of technical and human intelligence is the
resource.
(2) Building on this last point, we might note that the logical positivists discount most if not all of mental
phenomena—certainly in the party to the treaty—because the latter cannot be satisfactorily observed
but only inferred. But histories seem to suggest—from the Chan-kuo Ts'e through The Peloponnesian
War to modern journalistic accounts of ethnocentric conflicts—that intentions, beliefs, and all the other
mental constructs mentioned above are heavily involved in security matters. This applies not just to the
adversary, ally, neutral, or other, but to one’s own side and one’s very self. In fact, what about the
logical positivists' beliefs concerning observation, the material world, and logic? What do we make of
these beliefs in light of the positivists' critique of beliefs? What do the positivists make of their beliefs in
light of their belief critique?
(3) We also must note that logical positivists and other humans do not live their lives outside of national
security dilemmas as if logical positivism were the case. In matters of love, work, and various
aspirations our behaviors (based on introspection, consensual, interpersonal validation, and sociocultural conditioning via mass media) seem largely based on nomological networks of constructs having
less and less association with direct experience. We seem to accept this state of affairs in others as well
even as we may be on firmer, philosophical ground with ourselves.
(4) And what of the dissimulator? And our own self-deception? And the historicity of mental
processes? And because we have not directly observed most of history, does that mean most of history
does not exist? Or if history is defined by procedures of discovery, does a historical statement that the
Hittites conquered the Egyptians denote the past? Or does it denote only a future becoming a present
once we follow certain procedures of historiography which may be subverted by the hermeneutics of
suspicion?
In the world of treaty development and evaluation, the verifiers—regardless of what they profess—act
and always have acted as what we now call postmodernists. They develop, share, conflict over, and
deconstruct narratives of reality. Ultimately, their notions of deterrence, correlation of forces, offensive
and defensive capabilities, and destabilization are no different than notions of love and hate, of
sentiment, of unconscious psychodynamics engaged in shadow play.
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Return now to the results of the 2010 elections. Both the lame duck Senate and the new Senate poised
to begin work are les canards enchaînés [chained ducks referring to the French satirical newspaper
founded in 1915]. Only the humor is unintended. And this can be verified.
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